Ecosystem – Kuncoro Wastuwibowo

Strategi Pengembangan Ekosistem

Tulisan di Complexity Center tentang Padi UMKM sebagai case sebuah strategi bisnis berbasis complexity mengundang beberapa rekan mengajukan pertanyaan menarik, khususnya dalam bridging dari perspektif tentang complexity yang dianggap sangat teoretis dan rumit ke implementasi real di dunia bisnis dan teknis. Kebetulan aku sedang tulis paper berkait hal itu, yang fokusnya bukan ke produknya, tetapi ke strategi perusahan dalam mengembangkan ekosistem: bagaimana ekosistem ini dikawal, oleh siapa, dan dengan modal apa.

Saat pengembangan awal Padi UMKM di tahun 2020 (masa awal pandemi Covid-19), pengembangan ekosistem bisnis di Telkom Group dipimpin oleh Subdit Sinergi, bagian dari Dit Strategic Portfolio (DitSP). Platform dan bisnis Padi UMKM sendiri dipegang oleh Divisi Digital Business & Technology (DBT), bagian dari Dit Digital Business (DitDB). Ini bukan redundancy atau kesalahan rencana koordinasi, melainkan desain yang dibuat saat DitDSP dipecah jadi DitSP dan DitDB. Dalam case Padi UMKM, Div DBT berfokus pada platform, produk, dan bisnis; termasuk pembangunan, pemeliharaan, pengembangan, dan ekspansi. Kualitas, kapasitas, experience, inovasi, dll dll. Subdit Sinergi bekerja di lapisan lain: membentuk dan menumbuhkan ekosistem.

Sepenting apa strategi ekosistem? Padi UMKM bukan marketplace. Telkom baru membunuh marketplace Blanja.com saat Padi UMKM dirancang. Platform baru ini dirancang sebagai arsitektur koordinasi, tempat BUMN yang memiliki operasi pengadaan, UMKM di berbagai tingkatan dan sektor, lembaga keuangan, komunitas pembina UMKM, kementerian, dan lembaga regulasi dapat berinteraksi di level policy, strategi, bisnis, dan teknis. Setiap agent yang berbeda ini tentu memiliki concern yang sangat berbeda. Perspektif Complexity Economics dari WB Arthur menunjukkan bahwa dalam sistem seperti ini para agen beroperasi dalam ketidakpastian fundamental: mereka tidak memiliki rasionalitas seperti yang dibayangkan dalam perspektif ekonomi klasik; melainkan bersifat adaptif dan tunduk pada irasionalitas kolektif, volatilitas, dan disrupsi yang tidak dapat diprediksi dari perilaku setiap agent. Nilai keseluruhan sistem (synergy value) merupakan emergence yang muncul dari interaksi dinamis antar agent, bukan dari value setiap agent, termasuk agent kunci seperti pemilik platform. Para BUMN yang dikoordinasikan oleh Kementerian BUMN secara kolektif diposisikan sebagai pemilik simbolik ekosistem ini. Platform dimiliki Telkom, tetapi ekosistemnya dimiliki bersama. Apa inovasi yang diciptakan dari kebersamaan ini? Saat pandemi Covid-19 baru melanda, aku baca buku Christensen tentang Prosperity Paradox: pertumbuhan bisnis yang sesungguhnya, yaitu market-creating innovation, bukanlah soal mendatangi dan mengembangkan pasar yang ada, melainkan justru dari menciptakan pasar baru dari nonconsumption, dalam hal ini dari jutaan UMKM yang sebelumnya aksesnya sangat lemah ke industri nasional termasuk BUMN. Dalam bahasa HBR: strategi follow the money itu kuno dan bodoh, dan harus digantikan oleh follow where the money goes, atau create the environment where the money will have to go. Kembali ke Christensen, ini yang disebutnya paradoks kemakmuran: keberpihakan pada ekonomi rakyat adalah strategi bisnis yang paling efektif.

Di Telkom, Subdit Sinergi menjalankan tugas ini nyaris tanpa otoritas pada unit produksi dan unit bisnis, tanpa team dan anggaran yang besar, dan tanpa kendali internal atau eksternal. Modalnya adalah tuntutan visi dan strategi perusahaan, kepemimpinan yang suportif, keterlibatan yang dalam dan detail dalam lanskap kelembagaan, dan kemampuan membangun jejaring lintas unit dan institusi, melalui pengembangan konteks, komunikasi dan negosiasi, hingga approach pada regulasi. Dalam praktiknya, kami mengkoordinasikan para BUMN, termasuk via PMO Padi dan via kepemimpinan KBUMN, untuk mengkonversi operasi procurement menjadi demand engine; bernegosiasi dan berkolaborasi di level policy, strategy, hingga event dalam kerangka BBI (Bangga Buatan Indonesia), PBJP (Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah), dan P3DN (Peningkatan Penggunaan Produk Dalam Negeri) yang saat itu dipimpin Kemkomarves bersama K/L/PD terkait; mengawal koordinasi program ekspor bersama berbagai kementerian untuk mendorong UMKM menembus pasar internasional; membangun dan merawat hubungan dengan komunitas pengembang UMKM, termasuk Pemprov, Pemkab, ormas, dan marketplace, agar suplai UMKM berkualitas terus mengalir; serta menstrukturkan kesepakatan dengan bank dan lembaga keuangan seperti BRI Group (termasuk Pegadaian, PNM, Bank Raya) untuk memastikan UMKM punya akses pembiayaan yang akan memperbesar volume pasar. Ini tidak bisa menggunakan akses komando, melainkan melalui yang dalam istilah CAS disebut interaction architecture: membangun konteks di mana para agent terdorong untuk berkoordinasi secara sukarela demi kepentingan masing-masing.

Karena hal-hal ini merupakan implementasi dari complexity, banyak hal yang tampak kontraintuitif saat dilihat dari perspektif manajemen konvensional. Walau memiliki produk, platform, dan brand Padi UMKM, Telkom tidak mengklaim kepemilikan ekosistem. Padi UMKM diposisikan dalam narasi kepentingan nasional, bukan narasi korporat. Saat pemerintah pusat, dalam forum BBI/P3DN/PBJP meminta Padi UMKM diekspansi ke seluruh K/L/PD, Telkom mengusulkan agar pengadaan K/L/PD tetap dipegang entitas pemerintah, yaitu LKPP, dengan Telkom berlaku sebagai pengembang platform yang merupakan ekspansi dari Padi UMKM. Ini adalah ecological thinking: menjaga keberagaman dan modularitas agar sistem tetap adaptif, tidak terjebak dalam rigidity trap, di mana konektivitas yang terlalu tinggi tanpa keberagaman yang cukup membuat sistem justru menjadi rapuh. Telkom juga membangun path dependence: titik di mana ekosistem dapat tertanam dalam di berbagai lapisan institusional sehingga tak mudah dihentikan, kecuali oleh perubahan struktur yang massive oleh seluruh stakeholder. Ini adalah desain yang matang untuk keberlanjutan sistemik: memanfaatkan mekanisme increasing returns yang Arthur gambarkan, di mana setiap BUMN baru yang bergabung meningkatkan nilai platform bagi UMKM, dan setiap UMKM yang sukses bertransaksi memperkuat legitimasi politik ekosistem secara keseluruhan. Hasilnya terlihat nyata: per akhir 2024, ratusan ribu UMKM B2B terdaftar, 74.000 pembeli B2B, hampir 300.000 transaksi dalam setahun, dan GMV kumulatif melampaui IDR 28 triliun sejak peluncuran.

Dari sisi manajemen strategis, aku coba formulasikan narasi ini dalam paper Ecosystem Stewardship as Organisational Capability (masih ditulis). Hal yang dilaksanakan oleh Subdit Sinergi dalam kerangka Padi UMKM adalah sebuah kapabilitas organisasional yang nyata dan unik. Strategi di level ekosistem belum secara serius masuk ke dokumen strategi para BUMN. Ecosystem stewardship ini bukan platform management, bukan stakeholder management, dan bukan sekedar synergy program; melainkan sebuah kapabilitas untuk mengkatalisasi, mendukung, dan mengadaptasi sistem multi-aktor lintas batas kelembagaan, dimana para agent memiliki interdependensi dalam bentuk otoritas penuh untuk mengarahkan sistem secara sepihak. Tentunya cukup banyak narasi akademis yang mengimplementasikan CAS pada transformasi organisasi, supply chain, kesehatan, dan lain-lain. Namun bahkan belum banyak ditemukan narasi berisi formulasi eksplisit dan kohesif yang menyatukan complexity economics (Arthur), teori CAS (Holland), market ecology, dan kerangka ekosistem digital, lalu menerjemahkannya ke dalam desain dan implementasi kapabilitas organisasional lintas-institusi dalam skala nasional; dan kemudian bukan saja dijadikan kerangka teoretis, melainkan benar diimplementasikan dan menghasilkan dampak ekonomi yang terukur. Dalam pengertian itulah Padi UMKM, dan ecosystem stewardship sebagai kapabilitas yang menopangnya, menjadi inovasi yang layak mendapat perhatian lebih dari sekadar kisah sukses digital.

Ekosistem dalam konteks ini juga tidak selalu merujuk pada hubungan dengan pihak eksternal. Untuk perusahaan dengan grup yang besar, seperti holding, afiliasi, dan anak perusahaan, termasuk seperti Telkom Group, kita meyakini bahwa koordinasi dan kolaborasi yang paling efektif justru lahir ketika kita mengadopsi perspektif kompleksitas dan memperlakukan hubungan dalam grup sebagai ekosistem itu sendiri. Entitas-entitas dalam grup yang berbeda bukan sekadar unit yang perlu disinergikan secara administratif, tetapi dipandang sebagai agen-agen heterogen dengan visi misi, kapabilitas, dan dinamika adaptasi yang beragam. Mengelola mereka dengan prinsip ecosystem stewardship, bukan dengan pendekatan top-down yang mekanistik, adalah cara yang jauh lebih tepat untuk menciptakan nilai bersama. Dalam dunia yang semakin kompleks dan volatile, kemampuan semacam ini bukan kekenesan intelektual, melainkan telah menjadi prasyarat untuk bertahan dan tumbuh.

Padi UMKM

When I first designed what later became Padi UMKM, I did not do it in a boardroom. I did it at home, during long months of WFH in the middle of the Covid-19 pandemic. I drew the system on papers spread on the floor. At that time, my head was full of ideas about ecosystems, complexity theory, and complexity economics. I was not thinking about building another digital platform. I was thinking about how economic coordination itself breaks down under systemic shock, and how new coordination patterns might emerge when old ones collapse. In that sense, Padi UMKM was born less from a product mindset than from an ecosystem mindset, with complexity theory consciously in the background.

When the pandemic hit, what collapsed was not only the economy. What collapsed was the coordination logic of the economy. Supply chains broke, demand evaporated, SMEs lost access to markets, and institutions discovered that their standard operating procedures were designed for stability, not for systemic disruption. Many organisations reacted by accelerating digital projects, launching platforms, and optimising internal processes. That helped, but it did not address the deeper problem. The economic ecosystem itself had lost its organising structure. Actors that were rational in isolation could no longer produce coherent outcomes collectively. This is how complex systems behave under stress: when established coordination patterns fail, local rationality no longer aggregates into systemic order.

Padi UMKM did not start as a brilliant digital product idea. It started as a response to a coordination failure across a fragmented system of SOEs, SMEs, banks, regulators, ministries, and development agencies. All were acting with good intentions, yet through incompatible logics, timelines, and mandates. The system was not short of initiatives; it was short of coherence. In complexity terms, the economy had been pushed far from equilibrium, and the challenge was not optimisation but reorganisation. What was needed was not another tool, but a new pattern of interaction among heterogeneous agents.

The real innovation of Padi UMKM was therefore not the platform. The platform was the easy part. The digital workforce of Telkom Group can design platforms; that is an operational capability. The platform was necessary, and it became the core infrastructure of the ecosystem, but it was not the breakthrough. The breakthrough was the deliberate redefinition of roles within the economic system. SOEs must reposition their procurement operation into a capability of creating new market, i.e. an SME-based market structure. SMEs were not framed as beneficiaries of aid, but as economic agents that could be structurally integrated into formal procurement and value creation. Banks and financial institutions were not treated merely as lenders, but as part of an enabling architecture that combined financing with capability development and pathways to export. What changed was not a feature set. What changed was the pattern of interaction between economic actors.

The formal launching of Padi UMKM itself was not initiated by Telkom or by the Ministry of SOEs. It was planned within the nationwide BBI (Bangga Buatan Indonesia) program, because the central government needed a real, executable instrument to accelerate domestic economic circulation under crisis. Telkom showed a commitment to develop the platform, even though it was still imperfect at that time. The urgency was national, not corporate. This matters, because it positioned Padi UMKM from the beginning not as a corporate product launch, but as a systemic intervention embedded in a national recovery narrative. The early external promotion of Padi UMKM, beyond the internal SOE environment, was also driven by the BBI program. Over time, almost by systemic selection rather than by design, Padi UMKM became the de facto e-commerce infrastructure for BBI, as other platforms could not fit the specific institutional and ecosystemic roles required by the program.

From the beginning, we made a counterintuitive choice in the way the system was governed. Telkom deliberately limited its role to being the product and platform owner. The ecosystem itself was not branded as Telkom’s program. The community was symbolically owned by the Ministry of SOEs and by SOEs collectively. Even the name Padi UMKM did not originate from Telkom. This was not a political compromise; it was a strategic design choice grounded in complexity thinking. In complex systems, ecosystems tend to collapse when one actor over-claims ownership. When the platform owner also claims to own the ecosystem, other actors reduce their commitment, hedge their participation, or quietly resist. By stepping back from symbolic ownership, Telkom created space for other institutions to step forward. The platform provided the infrastructure, but the legitimacy of the ecosystem was deliberately distributed across actors.

At some point, something structurally interesting happened. The initiative crossed a threshold where no single actor could kill it anymore. The CEO of Telkom could not simply shut it down because the ecosystem had become institutionally embedded beyond Telkom. The Minister of SOEs could not dismantle it easily because it had become part of the official narrative of national economic recovery. The President could not disown it because it had been publicly positioned as a success story through BBI, PEN, and related programs. This was not political theatre. This was the moment when the system acquired path dependence. Once an initiative becomes embedded across multiple layers of institutional narrative and governance, it ceases to be a project and becomes part of the system itself. At that point, you are no longer managing a prograe. You are dealing with a living economic structure.

Value in Padi UMKM did not come from transactions alone. It emerged from the coupling of multiple layers of interaction. Transactions between SOEs and SMEs were reinforced by access to credit, by certification mechanisms that enabled formal participation, by development programmes that upgraded SME capabilities, and by pathways to export markets. None of these elements, on their own, would have been transformative. The transformation emerged from their interaction. This is how complex economies create value: not through linear pipelines, but through ecosystems in which different forms of capital, i.e. financial, institutional, social, and operational, reinforce one another over time.

Internally in Telkom, there was a structural separation of roles that proved critical. The Digital Business Directorate (DDB) operated at the product and business level. Its logic was operational: build, run, scale, monetise, and maintain the platform. Even as the platform owner and economic keystone, it remained only one agent within the broader ecosystem. In parallel, the Synergy Subdirectorate under the Strategic Portfolio Directorate worked at the ecosystem level. This role was not about features, roadmaps, or KPIs. It was about sensing emergent patterns of collaboration, mediating conflicts between institutions, and navigating collisions between policy signals and organisational incentives. In the early phase, the Synergy team also played a foundational role in organising cross-SOE agreements, preparing the multi-actor launch, embedding Padi UMKM within the BBI program, and connecting it with multiple SME build-up initiatives involving the Ministry of SMEs, the Ministry of Trade, and other institutions. This work was not linear project management; it was ecosystem orchestration under uncertainty.

In Indonesia’s context, the interaction between SOEs, SMEs, banks, and regulators is not merely complex; it is quasi-chaotic. Mandates overlap, incentives conflict, and policies evolve at different speeds and under different political pressures. In such an environment, precise prediction is an illusion. What becomes possible instead is navigation: sensing where constructive patterns of emergence are forming, dampening destructive feedback loops before they escalate, and shaping the boundaries within which the ecosystem evolves. This is not classical management. This is leadership under complexity.

As a result of its early success, there was a moment when the government, again through the BBI programme, asked to expand Padi UMKM to cover all government agencies (K/L/PD). On paper, this looked like success, with an enormous projected GMV. In reality, it carried a systemic risk. Full integration into the broader government procurement apparatus would have imposed rigid compliance structures and administrative constraints that could have frozen the adaptive dynamics that made the ecosystem work. The decision to return that expansion to LKPP, while positioning Telkom only as a platform provider for LKPP, was a deliberate choice to preserve modularity and flexibility over symbolic scale. In complex systems, scale without adaptability is not growth; it is fragility disguised as success.

What this experience ultimately taught us is uncomfortable for traditional management thinking. In complex economic ecosystems, you cannot engineer outcomes. You can only design conditions: boundaries, incentives, roles, and narratives that make constructive emergence more likely than destructive collapse. The platform mattered. The technology mattered. But what mattered more was the humility to accept that once an ecosystem becomes alive, you are no longer the architect standing outside the system. You are one of the agents operating within it.

The strategic lesson for C-level leadership is this. In times of systemic disruption, competitive advantage no longer lies primarily in having the most sophisticated product or the fastest execution. It lies in the capability to shape interaction spaces across institutions, sectors, and policy domains. Leadership shifts from control to stewardship. Strategy shifts from optimisation to navigation. And success is no longer measured only by ownership, but by whether the system you helped catalyse can survive, adapt, and continue to create value even when you step back.

That, ultimately, is what Padi UMKM represents. Not a digital product success story, but a case of how leadership, strategy, and technology can be recomposed to operate effectively in a complex, adaptive economy under crisis. It is an ecosystem in motion. It is Synergy in action.

Note: This is a copy of my post at Complexity Center [LINK] and an update of my initial story about Padi UMKM written 5 years ago [LINK].

Padi UMKM — A Complexity Case

CIMA Strategic Leaders Talk

Within the global finance profession, CIMA (Chartered Institute of Management Accountants) has the responsibility for setting management accounting competency standards oriented towards business strategy. In alliance with the AICPA, CIMA facilitates the CGMA (Chartered Global Management Accountant) professional designation, ensuring that practitioners possess a universal business language for managing organisational performance. The Country Manager for CIMA in Indonesia is Mr Dwi Putra, a Coventry University alumnus who first identified me as a member of the ‘Order of the Phoenix’ because my iPhone lock screen displayed the classic Coventry University logo.

At CIMA’s invitation, on 12 February 2026, I delivered my presentation a CIMA Strategic Leaders Breakfast Talk at the Cyber 2 Building entitled “Leadership in the Age of Disruption — Strategic Leadership for Modern Finance Professionals”. The initial plan was for me to be the sole speaker; however, Mr M Fahmi El Mubarak, CEO of the BUMN School of Excellence, was later added to the programme. It was a real honour for me to share the stage with him.

As discussed at the briefing with CIMA, I explored disruption from the perspective of complexity. The discussion began with a deconstruction of neoclassical economic models, opening up insights into complexity economics. Business as a whole was reviewed as a Complex Adaptive System (CAS), i.e. a system comprising autonomous agents that interact and adapt without rigid, centralised control. The ecosystem is viewed as a dynamic interaction that generates new values non-linearly through the process of emergence.

From the perspective of complexity economics, disruption is not a nuisance but rather an engine of evolution, marking a qualitative shift in economic regimes. Strategy has moved from mere optimisation of old models towards a redesign of business architecture that prioritises learning speed and co-evolution with the ecosystem. Competitive advantage is no longer determined by scale or static efficiency, but by architectural flexibility in responding to internal and external feedback constantly.

Disruption also represents the optimal point for innovation to occur. We refer to this as the Edge of Chaos, which is the transition zone between order (stagnation) and disorder (chaos). In this zone, the system possesses the precise balance required to trigger innovation without descending into anarchy. Excessive order leads only to organisational stagnation, while total chaos results in systemic failure. The duty of leadership is to keep the organisation at this threshold to ensure sustainability through adaptive experimentation.

In an ecosystem model, the role of leadership is that of an ecologist. Leaders no longer micromanage outputs; instead, they are tasked with fostering a culture and environment that enables teams to self-organise. This approach utilises simple rules to guide autonomous decision-making, replacing rigid SOPs that are often too brittle to face ambiguity. Leaders must be courageous enough to engage in safe-to-fail probing: launching multiple small experiments simultaneously to detect strategic opportunities that traditional analytical models might overlook.

Returning to CIMA’s focus on Management Accounting (MA), MA plays a crucial role in governing strategic planning in this exponential era through the SPX framework from the IEEE. MA must be capable of performing Strategic Cost Management to monitor future horizons, utilising Real Options Analysis to value investments as strategic options, and implementing Agile Capital Budgeting. By moving away from rigid annual budgets towards Rolling Forecasts and Throughput Accounting, MA ensures that resource allocation is based on real-time feedback and the velocity of value conversion.

In closing, it was conveyed that disruption must be managed as a catalyst for achieving sustainability and a better quality of life. We must stop viewing business as a machine to be controlled mechanistically and start managing it as a living ecosystem with the capacity to renew itself continually. Furthermore, the finest innovations are those capable of creating new markets and providing a tangible impact on strengthening the economy of society.

Navigasi di Edge of Chaos

Dalam profesi keuangan global, CIMA (Chartered Institute of Management Accountants) berperan sebagai penyusun standar kompetensi akuntansi manajemen yang berorientasi pada strategi bisnis. Beraliansi dengan AICPA, CIMA memfasilitasi gelar profesional CGMA (Chartered Global Management Accountant) yang memastikan para praktisi memiliki bahasa bisnis universal dalam mengelola kinerja organisasi. Country manager CIMA di Indonesia adalah Mas Dwi Putra, alumnus Coventry University yang pertama kali mengenaliku sebagai anggota Order of the Phoenix gegara layar Aifon-ku menampilkan logo klasik Coventry University.

Atas undangan CIMA, tanggal 12 Februari 2026 ini di Gedung Cyber 2 aku mengisi sesi CIMA Strategic Leaders Breakfast Talk dengan judul “Leadership in the Age of Disruption — Strategic Leadership for Modern Finance Professionals”. Plan awal, aku jadi pembicara tunggal. Namun kemudian ditambahkan Bapak M Fahmi El Mubarak, CEO BUMN School of Excellent. Wow, a real honour for me untuk sepanggung beliau.

Sesuai briefing dengan CIMA, aku mendetailkan disrupsi dari perspektif kompleksitas. Bahasan diawali dengan dekonstruksi terhadap model ekonomi neoklasik, dan membuka wawasan atas ekonomi kompleksitas. Keseluruhan bisnis ditinjau sebagai Complex Adaptive System (CAS), yaitu sistem yang terdiri atas agen otonom yang saling berinteraksi dan beradaptasi tanpa kontrol terpusat yang kaku. Ekosistem dipandang sebagai interaksi dinamis yang menghasilkan nilai-nilai baru secara non-linier melalui proses emergence.

Dari perspektif ekonomi kompleksitas, disrupsi bukanlah gangguan, melainkan mesin evolusi yang menandai pergeseran rezim ekonomi secara kualitatif. Strategi kini berpindah dari sekadar optimisasi model lama menuju desain ulang arsitektur bisnis yang mengutamakan kecepatan belajar dan co-evolution dengan ekosistem. Keunggulan kompetitif tidak lagi ditentukan oleh skala atau efisiensi statis, melainkan oleh fleksibilitas arsitektural dalam merespons umpan balik internal dan eksternal secara konstan.

Disrupsi juga merupakan titik optimal terjadinya inovasi. Kita menyebutnya the Edge of Chaos, yaitu zona transisi antara keteraturan (order) dan ketidakteraturan (chaos). Pada zona ini, sistem memiliki keseimbangan yang tepat untuk memicu inovasi tanpa terjatuh ke dalam anarki. Keteraturan yang terlalu kaku hanya akan membawa organisasi pada stagnasi, sementara kekacauan total akan berujung pada kegagalan sistemik. Tugas leadership adalah menjaga organisasi tetap berada di ambang ini untuk memastikan keberlanjutan melalui eksperimentasi yang adaptif.

Dalam model ekosistem, peran leadership adalah sebagai ecologist. Pemimpin tidak lagi mendikte output secara mikro, melainkan bertugas memfasilitasi budaya dan ekosistem agar tim bisa mengorganisir diri secara mandiri. Pendekatan ini menggunakan aturan-aturan sederhana (simple rules) untuk memandu pengambilan keputusan otonom, menggantikan SOP yang seringkali terlalu rapuh menghadapi ambiguitas. Pemimpin harus berani melakukan safe-to-fail probing: meluncurkan berbagai eksperimen kecil secara simultan untuk mendeteksi peluang strategis yang mungkin terlewatkan oleh model analisis tradisional.

Kembali ke CIMA yang berfokus ke management accounting (MA). MA memiliki peran krusial dalam mengendalikan perencanaan strategis di era eksponensial ini melalui kerangka SPX dari IEEE. MA harus mampu melakukan Strategic Cost Management untuk memantau horizon masa depan, menggunakan Real Options Analysis untuk menilai investasi sebagai opsi strategis, serta menerapkan Agile Capital Budgeting. Dengan meninggalkan anggaran tahunan yang kaku dan beralih ke Rolling Forecasts serta Throughput Accounting, MA memastikan bahwa alokasi sumber daya didasarkan pada umpan balik real-time dan kecepatan konversi nilai.

Sebagai penutup, disampaikan bahwa disrupsi harus dikelola sebagai katalis untuk mencapai keberlanjutan dan kualitas hidup yang lebih baik. Kita harus berhenti memandang bisnis sebagai mesin yang harus dikontrol secara mekanistis, dan mulai mengelolanya sebagai ekosistem hidup yang memiliki kapasitas untuk terus memperbarui dirinya sendiri. Juga, inovasi terbaik adalah inovasi yang mampu menciptakan pasar baru dan memberikan dampak nyata bagi penguatan ekonomi masyarakat.

Navigating Business at the Edge of Chaos

This is a speech preparation for the CIMA & AICPA Strategic Leaders Breakfast Talk, to be held in mid-February 2026, under the theme ‘Leadership in the Age of Disruption — Strategic Leadership for Modern Finance Professionals’. I will deliver the presentation from the perspective of complexity science and complexity economics, before exploring the practical implementations for management accounting professionals.

In current economic landscape, business must be perceived as the development of an ecosystem that operates as a complex adaptive system (CAS). Within this framework, autonomous agents, both internal to the firm and across broader business networks, possess the capacity for independent decision-making and activity. From this complexity perspective, phenomena such as VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity) and disruption are no longer viewed as external threats to be mitigated or overcome. Instead, they are recognised as engines of evolution and qualitative opportunities to redesign business architecture. Strategy shifts from the mere optimisation of saturated, linear models toward the cultivation of dynamic ecosystems that generate new value through the process of emergence.

The optimal zone for such innovation is the Edge of Chaos, which is a critical transition state where a system balances order and stability with disorder and change. It is precisely in this zone, rather than in a state of total equilibrium, where optimal innovation occurs. For the modern enterprise, the Edge of Chaos is not a threat to be avoided, but a strategic space to be occupied and, if necessary, intentionally created. Competitive advantage in this regime is defined not by scale or static efficiency, but by architectural flexibility and the velocity of learning in response to constant internal and external feedback loops.

Leadership within this complex environment requires a fundamental shift in identity toward that of an ecologist. The leader’s primary duty is no longer the top-down control of outputs, but the creation of conditions and cultures that enable teams to self-organise. This involves managing the delicate tension at the Edge of Chaos, introducing enough healthy friction to trigger innovation without descending into systemic anarchy. Rigid & brittle SOPs are replaced by simple rules or heuristics that guide autonomous decision-making amidst ambiguity. Leaders must facilitate safe-to-fail probing, i.e. launching multiple, simultaneous, low-cost experiments to detect strategic signals and opportunities that traditional analytical models inevitably miss.

Strategic management in the exponential era demands ambidextrous design, balancing the exploitation of core operations with the continuous exploration of new ventures through modular structures. This necessitates the orchestration of resources far beyond traditional organisational boundaries, incorporating partners, start-ups, and regulators into platform-based strategies. Strategy is viewed as a process of co-evolution, where the organisation constantly reinvents itself to remain congruent with a shifting environment.

Finally, Management Accounting (MA) serves as the vital navigation instrument in this journey through the Strategic Planning for Exponential Era (SPX) framework. MA must evolve to support dynamic feasibility, utilising Real Options Analysis to value investments as strategic options—the right to expand, delay, or pivot—rather than rigid, one-way capital bets. This implementation includes Agile Capital Budgeting, where funds are allocated to strategic “buckets” rather than granular, unproven projects. By abandoning the stagnation of rigid annual budgets in favour of Rolling Forecasts and Throughput Accounting, MA ensures that resource allocation is driven by real-time feedback and the velocity of value conversion. Ultimately, the most profound business developments are market-creating innovations that not only ensure sustainability but actively uplift the economy and quality of life for society

IEEE HTC 2025

The IEEE Region 10 Humanitarian Technology Conference (HTC) 2025 was carried out at Chiba University of Commerce, Japan, from 28 September to 1 October, bringing together global visionaries under the theme “Beyond SDGs, A New Humanitarian Era with Intelligent Partners.” The conference highlighted the synergy between human intellect and emerging intelligent systems in advancing humanitarian impact through technology.

During the Opening Ceremony, Grayson Randall, President of the IEEE Humanitarian Technologies Board (HTB), delivered an address emphasising the special position of the engineering profession in improving and enhancing the quality of life. His message underscored that engineers are not merely problem-solvers but architects of hope, capable of bridging innovation with social responsibility. He further presented new opportunities within HT programmes to stimulate inclusive and impactful projects across the Asia-Pacific region. On the second day, IEEE President-Elect Mary Ellen Randall presented a visionary keynote speech outlining IEEE’s roadmap for advancing the engineering profession in alignment with global human development goals. She articulated how IEEE’s strategic directions, from digital ethics to sustainable innovation, converge towards one essential mission, the enhancement of human life quality through intelligent collaboration.

On Day 3 (1 October), I delivered my presentation in Special Program 15, titled “Synergy for Sustainable Impact.” The session, moderated by Allya Paramitha, brought together distinguished panellists Hidenobu Harasaki, Husain Mahdi, Agnes Irwanti, Bernard Lim, Chie Sato, Saurabh Soni, and your truly. The discussion explored collaborative mechanisms between technology, policy, and social innovation to accelerate humanitarian outcomes through sustainable synergy. I often begin my presentations on synergy, ecosystems, and industry collaboration by framing them within the principles of complexity theory, illustrating how synergies can generate emergent, non-linear value in complex socio-technical ecosystems. These emergences are the key to the transformations central to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly in fostering inclusivity, resilience, and equity.

Drawing from Indonesia’s national vision, I illustrated how the MSME commerce ecosystem has become a model of humanitarian technology application in real-world contexts. Through programmes focusing on microfinance, digital platforms, and cooperative empowerment, the framework demonstrated how technology can elevate non-consumption markets into productive and sustainable systems. I also shared case studies in which IEEE Indonesia SIGHT in Sociopreneurship and Sustainability provides capability building for IEEE Indonesia Student Branches, each designing local solutions including solar-powered water systems, IoT monitoring, and sociopreneurship incubation, as currently being undertaken by Gadjah Mada University and Udayana University. These projects exemplify how engineering-led engagements can evolve into community-driven sociopreneurship, ensuring sustainability through ownership, replication, and measurable impact.

On Day 0 (28 September), I provided a briefing on these programmes to IEEE President-Elect Mary Ellen Randall and HTB President Grayson Randall. These exchanges laid the groundwork for advancing IEEE humanitarian initiatives in Indonesia and the Asia-Pacific region, focusing on digital ecosystems, sociopreneurship, and sustainable innovation models. I also discussed these programmes during Special Program 13 (30 September), “From Innovation to Impact: Advancing IEEE Humanitarian Initiatives”, where I joined the HTA Forum to discuss strategic alignment between IEEE humanitarian frameworks and regional ecosystem development.

The IEEE R10 HTC 2025 stood out not only as a conference of ideas but as a living demonstration of synergy, the fusion of intellect, empathy, and technology. The conference reaffirmed a timeless truth, engineering is not merely about machines or systems, but about humanity itself. The IEEE R10 HTC 2025 thus marked another milestone in the collective journey to build a more equitable, resilient, and sustainable world, powered by both human insight and intelligent innovation.

Synergy Value as Emergence

When considering mergers, acquisitions, alliances, or even intra-group synergies, it is useful to shift our perspective away from additive arithmetic and towards the philosophy of emergence. In complex systems, including business ecosystems as complex adaptive systems, value does not reside solely within the parts; rather, it arises through the patterned interactions between them. This emergent phenomenon is precisely what in corporate finance is labelled synergy value. In formal terms, we may describe the total incremental value of a collaboration as

where V(x; G) denotes the value of the whole system, generated by the vector of resources and activities x under a specific governance structure G, and ∑V represents the value of each entity in isolation. The very fact that ΔV may be greater than zero testifies to emergence: complementarities in action, dependencies properly orchestrated, and adaptive patterns unfolding across the system.

The Levers of Emergent Synergy

Four principal levers determine whether emergent value materialises or evaporates. The first is complementarity, or what economists term supermodularity. This describes the situation in which activities reinforce each other such that the marginal return of undertaking one activity is enhanced by the undertaking of another; formally, the cross-partial derivatives are positive (𝛿²V/𝛿xi 𝛿xj > 0). It is here that the popular slogan “one plus one equals more than two” has rigorous grounding.

The second lever is the interdependence structure. Every collaboration has a topology of dependencies, where some assets act as complements, others as substitutes, and some nodes become bottlenecks through which the value of the entire system is channelled. In business ecosystems, mapping this structure is indispensable, for it often dictates whether modularity and flexible linkages suffice, or whether full absorption is required.

The third lever is defined by the adaptive rules of the system. A collaboration is not static; it is a complex adaptive system in which local decisions, feedback loops, and routines create new global patterns. Where local experimentation is permitted, and where feedback loops are properly designed, valuable behaviours diffuse through the organisation or alliance. Where rigidity prevails, the system is condemned to stasis, and synergy remains a theoretical promise rather than an emergent reality.

Finally, there is the matter of orchestration capacity. This refers to the dynamic capabilities of leadership—sensing opportunities, seizing them through resource allocation, and reconfiguring the system as environments change. Ashby’s principle of requisite variety reminds us that the variety of governance and decision-making tools must match the variety and volatility of the environment. Without adequate orchestration, even strong complementarities and favourable topologies may collapse under the weight of integration costs.

Applications Across Collaboration Types

In mergers and acquisitions, the choice of integration model should mirror the degree of interdependence. The celebrated Haspeslagh–Jemison framework reminds us that absorption is not always optimal; linkage or preservation may unlock more emergent value when autonomy is vital. The risk of the so-called synergy mirage lies precisely in misjudging complementarities and ignoring the time it takes for emergent patterns to stabilise. Thus, every acquisition is less a completed transaction than a hypothesis about the future, whose proof lies in the integration process.

In alliances and joint ventures, synergy takes the form of options on emergence. Here, limited commitments allow parties to test complementarities without over-committing capital. The collaborative form is well-suited to contexts of uncertainty, where exploration of emergent patterns is required. Ecosystem logic also applies: co-opetition and the management of network externalities often define the extent of emergent value.

For intra-group business synergy, emergence must be cultivated across corporate units. Here, Herbert Simon’s notion of near-decomposability becomes instructive: groups should design modular interfaces so that subsidiaries adapt locally yet align globally. To maintain cooperation, emergent rents must be shared fairly; cooperative game theory suggests the Shapley value as one method of allocating incremental value in proportion to each unit’s marginal contribution. Without such fairness, group members are tempted to defect, undermining the collaborative potential of the system.

Measuring and Governing Emergence

Because synergy is emergent, it resists simple enumeration. Yet it is not beyond the reach of disciplined measurement. One may begin with a complementarity map, estimating where cross-partials are most positive, and therefore where joint action may yield the greatest return. Alongside, an ecosystem dependency graph may be drawn, in the spirit of Ron Adner’s ecosystem mapping, to reveal missing complements and bottlenecks whose removal could unlock value.

Where uncertainty is high, the logic of real options should prevail. Pilot projects, staged investments, or minority stakes serve as options to explore emergent potential without risking catastrophic downside. Parallel to this, a system of synergy accounting may be implemented, in which incremental value is decomposed using Shapley allocations, thereby aligning incentives with marginal contributions to the whole.

The Philosophical Bottom Line

Synergy lives not in assets but in interactions. Corporate actions—whether a merger, an alliance, or an intra-group initiative—are best understood as interventions in a complex system. When complementarities are strong, interdependencies are designed with care, adaptive rules permit experimentation, and orchestration capacity is sufficient, emergent synergy is more than a hopeful metaphor; it becomes an observable reality. Conversely, where these levers are mismanaged, the promised “1 + 1 > 2” dissolves into disappointment, integration costs, and value destruction.

Thus, the philosophy of emergence, long a staple of complexity science, is not an academic curiosity but a practical guide to business collaboration. It teaches us that the true measure of a deal or alliance lies not in the parts themselves, but in the patterns of interaction that the collaboration enables.

MSME Financing

Now about the MSME ecosystem.

The Govt has repeatedly mentioned that we have 65 million MSMEs in Indonesia, and that the MSME are the very backbone of the national economy: they contribute ±61% of GDP and provide ±120 million jobs, nearly the entire labour force. Yet for all their importance, they are treated with something close to neglect by national financial system. While state banks happily court the large corporates and property developers, the millions of small firms that keep the country running receive less than 20% of their credit. And when the MSME secure a loan, they pay dearly for it, at interest rates of 12%–18% per year, even when BI’s rate rests at 5%. A curious kind of financial apartheid: the majority does the heavy lifting, the minority enjoys the cheap capital.

The Minister of Finance, to add insult to injury, has been swifter at taxing MSME than at financing them. Efforts to broaden the tax base focus on micro firms while the big players continue to enjoy exemptions, incentives, and creative loopholes. Programs intended to strengthen domestic small industry, remain piecemeal, minimally supported, and shifted instead to use the MSME data for taxing. The rhetoric is that MSMEs are the backbone of the economy; the practice is that they are milked like docile cows for easy revenue, without being fed the credit that might fatten them into global competitors.

There is surely the KUR program the Govt always mentions, which offers subsidised credit to small businesses. In H1/2025, around Rp 133T was disbursed to some 2.3 million borrowers. That number is impressive on its own, yet it reaches only 3% or 4% of the total MSME population. And the balance is skewed beyond recognition: nearly 1.9 million of those borrowers were micro firms, a modest 159 thousand were small firms, and a mere 16 thousand were so-called ultra-micro. Medium-sized enterprises are excluded entirely, with the optimistic expectation that they will graduate to commercial loans — a graduation ceremony that only rarely takes place.

KUR is not nothing, but neither is it enough. What Indonesia needs is a breakthrough: a national credit guarantee scheme that shares risks between the state and the banks and, in doing so, brings down lending rates while opening the doors of finance to millions who are currently shut out. The idea is simple. If a portion of loans in a defined portfolio go bad, the state-backed guarantor pays part of the loss. With that safety net in place, banks can lend at lower rates and to a wider circle of borrowers.

This is not some wild experiment. South Korea’s KODIT has long guaranteed up to 85% of SME loans; Japan’s municipal credit guarantee corporations have done the same for decades, usually at 80% coverage. The US Small Business Administration runs its own guarantees on 75% to 85% of small business loans. Europe operates portfolio schemes through InvestEU. The lesson is consistent: when governments shoulder part of the risk, banks lend more, charge less, and the fiscal costs remain entirely manageable.

What would this look like in Indonesia? Imagine a scheme supporting 1.5 million loans per year, with an average size of Rp 150 million, creating an annual portfolio of roughly Rp 225T. The guarantor would cover 40% of first losses, capped at 10% of the portfolio to prevent excess. Banks would pay a fee of 1.8% p.a., softened by a small state subsidy of 0.4%. In practice, this would mean loans to small businesses priced at about 3.5% lower than they are today. The expected fiscal cost to the state would be about Rp 2.3T per year, with a guarantor capital buffer of roughly Rp 8T. For the price of a single prestige infrastructure project, the government could transform access to finance for millions of enterprises.

The institutions are already there. Jamkrindo and Askrindo could act as front-line guarantors just like KUR. PII could serve as a backstop. Multilateral lenders such as the World Bank, ADB, or IsDB could add further insurance, while state and private banks would originate the loans. Oversight and enforcement would fall to the Ministry of Finance, Bank Indonesia, and the Financial Services Authority (OJK), with the Ministry of MSME ensuring that outreach truly extends beyond Java and into women-owned and first-time borrowers.

The expected results could be far from trivial. With 1.5 million new loans guaranteed each year, more small firms would cross into the formal economy. Average borrowing rates would fall from the current 12% to 15% into the single digits. Employment would grow by perhaps one million jobs a year, as enterprises invest and expand. GDP growth would tick upward by at least 0.5%. And because borrowers under the scheme must be formally registered, the tax base would widen, meaning the program could ultimately pay for itself.

Indonesia cannot hope to reach sustained 6%–7% growth while its entrepreneurs are trapped in a high-cost credit desert. This lending guarantee program would provide them with the rain they need. Alongside, the state should push forward with digital credit scoring, drawing on tax, e-commerce, and utility data; it should open the way for SME bonds and securitisation; and it should modernise collateral laws so that machinery, vehicles, and inventory can be pledged as security, not only land and buildings.

Without accelarating these programs, Indonesia risks remaining a dual economy: one world of corporates enjoying cheap capital and tax incentives, and another of millions of MSMEs left to carry the country on their backs while paying through the nose for the privilege.

The US Trade Imbalance

The United States has long been concerned about its persistent trade imbalance, frequently attributing responsibility to its business-partner countries for the gap between imports and exports. However, it should be recognised that most of the imbalance originates internally, driven by American corporations’ strategic pursuit of short-term profits, often through aggressive offshore profit-shifting practices. American businesses with the highest capitalisation, such as Apple, Google, and Microsoft, significantly contribute to this imbalance by establishing subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions like Ireland or Bermuda, legally diverting profits and depriving the US Treasury of critical tax revenues.

Apple has routinely utilised offshore structures, holding over $200 billion overseas at one point, strategically positioning intellectual property (IP) subsidiaries in countries with more favourable tax policies. Similarly, Google’s “Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich” facilitated the shifting of billions in global advertising revenue, resulting in minimal domestic taxation. These practices are typically legal yet ethically contentious, with annual corporate profit-shifting estimated between $300 and $350 billion, leading to approximately $100–$150 billion in lost US tax revenue each year, according to estimates from the Congressional Budget Office and economist Gabriel Zucman.

In addition to technology firms, professional service companies such as McKinsey, other consultancy firms, and numerous US law firms frequently establish regional offices overseas, ensuring substantial earnings remain offshore. Although these practices are mostly legal, they highlight the significant internal roots of the trade imbalance, reflecting structural issues in corporate governance and tax policy rather than external economic aggression.

To meaningfully address these challenges, the US should initiate comprehensive internal reforms, beginning with corporate governance. A decisive shift from shareholder capitalism—prioritising quarterly profits—to stakeholder capitalism, where companies equally value long-term investments in employees, communities, and sustainability, is essential. The 2019 Business Roundtable statement was a symbolic step in this direction, but substantial action has been limited. True reform necessitates redefining executive compensation to incentivise sustainable, long-term growth rather than stock price manipulation through buybacks.

On the policy front, the US government should strengthen anti-profit-shifting measures by enhancing transparency through mandatory country-by-country financial reporting and enforcing stringent economic substance requirements. Implementing the OECD-backed global minimum tax (15%) could curb excessive offshore tax arbitrage by ensuring multinationals pay fair taxes irrespective of where they report profits. Additionally, penalising superficial offshore structures while incentivising genuine domestic investments could significantly mitigate revenue losses.

Ethically, American corporate culture should evolve to reject aggressive tax avoidance as standard practice. Promoting ethical standards and responsible business conduct, supported by public advocacy, investor pressure through Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) criteria, and transparent financial disclosures, could substantially reshape corporate behaviour. Institutional investors, pension funds, and even individual consumers can wield considerable influence by rewarding ethical corporate actions and penalising short-termist, exploitative strategies.

Ultimately, resolving the US trade imbalance is not solely about external tariffs or punitive measures against other nations but requires confronting internal structural issues directly. By embracing rigorous regulatory reforms, incentivising ethical corporate governance, and committing to strategic long-term economic planning, America can effectively rebalance trade, recover significant lost revenues, and foster sustainable economic prosperity for future generations.